Free CrowdStrike CCCS-203b Actual Exam Questions
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actionable recommendation?
A/C? Disabling unused admission controllers is a good security move but feels more like cluster hardening than an image-specific fix. Updating images (C) directly addresses what the scan highlights.
Maybe C makes the most sense since after scanning, the logical step is to patch those critical vulnerabilities in the images rather than changing cluster settings.
appropriate action to mitigate risks associated with these accounts?
Maybe B is better since it lets you catch any unexpected use or threat before deciding to delete or restore accounts, reducing risk without rushing. A and D feel too extreme without that monitoring step.
Maybe C works too since it cuts off access but keeps everything ready if the user needs to be reactivated, avoiding any operational delays while managing risk.
overly permissive roles and no recent usage?
Makes sense to go with D here. Instead of jumping straight to deleting the SP, it’s smarter to trim down its permissions first and see if that solves the issue, especially since it hasn’t been used lately. That way, you reduce risk without causing possible disruptions.
Probably D since adjusting permissions is safer before deleting anything.
high-risk practice that should be flagged for remediation?
Maybe D is a good security step, but it’s not a misconfiguration or a risk on its own—it’s actually protective. A and C are positive controls that reduce risk, so they’re unlikely to be flagged. B stands out because leaving port 22 wide open basically invites brute force attacks and unauthorized access. Even if you have monitoring, the open port itself is a clear misconfiguration. So yeah, B is definitely the risky setup that needs fixing here.
It’s B, open port 22 is a straight-up invite for attackers.
you notice a rule that detects misconfigured IAM roles in your AWS environment. What action should
you configure for this rule to prevent unauthorized access effectively?
Option A could work as a safer first step by monitoring misconfigured roles without taking any immediate action. This way, you get visibility and can assess the severity before deciding on further steps. Auto-remediation (C) seems too aggressive since deleting roles might break legitimate access. B sounds good in theory but probably can’t be enforced automatically through the policy. So, setting it to monitor first makes sense to gather data and avoid unnecessary disruptions.
B/D? Adding least-privilege conditions sounds ideal but might not be enforceable automatically, so alerting the team (D) ensures quick human response without risky auto-changes.
cloud environments?
D imo, because Falcon’s strength lies in built-in automation and module integration, no third-party needed.
Option D seems right because Falcon’s design is all about seamless integration and automation within its own platform, not relying on manual setups or outside tools like third-party APIs.
compliance over time. Which of the following is a requirement for successfully setting up and using
scheduled reports?
Makes sense to rule out B since permissions can be role-based, not just full admin. A it is.
A/B? I think the key part is setting up the reports correctly with the right data and delivery options (A). B seems too restrictive since custom roles often have enough rights without full admin access.
trusted container images from specific registries are scanned and allowed for deployment. What is the
best approach for adding registry connection details?
Skipping authentication like in B risks untrusted images slipping through.
C imo makes the most sense since you can’t just rely on default settings or skip auth for private registries. Setting the registry URL and adding authentication if needed ensures only trusted images get scanned before deployment. A or B wouldn’t provide enough control or security, and D is risky because even private repos can have vulnerabilities. The key is locking down which images are allowed by properly connecting and authenticating with each registry.
console?
Maybe D makes the most sense since stopping new data while keeping old alerts visible fits typical behavior after deprovisioning. A and C sound too temporary or strict to me.
Guessing A because a short grace period to recover data after deprovisioning is common practice, so the data might stick around briefly before it's gone for good.
designed to identify and address?
C for sure, risky permissions on multiple identities is classic CIEM territory.
C imo, it’s about risky permissions on identities, which fits CIEM’s main use.
outbound traffic from a Kubernetes pod to an unknown external IP. The analyst needs to determine
whether the traffic is malicious and identify the process responsible for the connection. Which
CrowdStrike Falcon feature should the analyst use to identify network connections at the process level?
C imo. Falcon Sensor Network Visibility is the only option that specifically links network connections to individual processes, which is exactly what’s needed here. The other options are more about logs, identity, or sandboxing, not real-time process-level network monitoring. As others said, there might be version or config requirements for Kubernetes, but the feature itself is designed for this use case.
Maybe C, since it tracks network activity linked to specific processes inside containers.
important to perform a dry run before enabling the workflow in production?
Option B seems solid because the dry run is about making sure your workflow behaves as expected without actually changing anything. That way, you catch logic errors or unexpected outcomes before hitting production. Also, it’s not really about permissions or reports, so A, C, and D don’t fit as well. Testing on a limited set (A) is more like a pilot, but dry run specifically means no changes happen at all.
Yeah, dry run’s main point is to test logic without real changes, so B.
policies related to cloud service access. Which of the following represents a misconfiguration that needs
immediate remediation?
Option C clearly breaks the least privilege principle; way too broad.
It’s C, no way production access should be that open, no exceptions.
in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run referencing a newly created executable in
the user’s AppData\Roaming directory. What does this likely indicate?
A, because malware often uses Run keys and AppData for stealthy startup persistence.
A, since AppData\Roaming and Run key tweaks are classic malware persistence signs.
privileges, as identified by a CIEM solution?
It’s A because no recent activity combined with write access means the developer likely doesn’t need those privileges anymore, which is exactly what CIEM tools target for cleanup.
A/B? If the revoked role in B still grants access, that’s a clear CIEM issue. But A’s no activity for six months with write access also screams unnecessary privilege. Both seem valid depending on how strict the CIEM is.