Free Top CompTIA Pentest+ PT0-003 Actual Exam Questions

It’s C for sure. The encoded ../ patterns clearly show an attempt to break out of a restricted folder and access a sensitive file, which perfectly matches directory traversal.

Option C stands out here because the attacker uses encoded ../ sequences to climb out of the allowed directory and access /etc/passwd, which is a classic directory traversal move. The key point is they’re trying to read a system file by tricking the path resolution, not necessarily including that file in a script or exploiting a reference flaw. So it fits directory traversal more than local file inclusion or other options.

It’s A because the main goal is to get credentials for other systems, and Mimikatz directly pulls those from memory. B and D don’t really help with AD-wide access, and C depends on already having creds.

It’s A. Mimikatz is really the standard tool for extracting credentials directly from memory on a compromised Windows endpoint, which fits perfectly with the goal of moving laterally in an AD environment. B doesn’t work as well here since cracking local passwords isn’t necessary if you can grab creds directly. C depends on having valid creds first, which Mimikatz helps get. D is more about initial exploitation, not lateral movement using existing credentials. So, using Mimikatz to get those account details is the most straightforward way to achieve the tester's objective.

Option D. The command is searching for "pass" across config and text files, aiming to find secret data like passwords, not just the files themselves or permissions.

Makes sense, they want to find any secrets containing “pass,” so D.

Maybe D fits best here since the WAF issue impacts multiple stakeholders, not just the tester or one team. Getting everyone on the same page can help decide the next steps properly.

I’m thinking client acceptance (C) might be important here since that’s when you confirm the test scope and any known blockers like a WAF. Shouldn't this be cleared before testing starts?

A Encoding can be easily detected since most DLP tools recognize common encoding schemes. It’s probably not the best choice compared to encryption or compression which hide data better.

Maybe B works too since compression can hide patterns better than simple encoding, making it harder for DLP to spot sensitive data unless it decompresses first. Encryption’s still strong but depends on tool capabilities.

A/D? A has the highest EPSS, meaning attackers are more likely to try it, but D’s CVSS is higher, so the impact is worse if exploited. Attackers might prefer A for ease or D for damage.

Option D seems better because even though its EPSS score is lower than A’s, the CVSS score is higher, meaning the vulnerability is more severe. Attackers usually aim for vulnerabilities that are both likely to be exploited and have a high impact. So, having a higher CVSS with a decent EPSS might make Target 4 more attractive than Target 1.

A vs C? While disabling external entities (C) is ideal to stop this vulnerability directly, sometimes apps absolutely need them for legit reasons. In those cases, just locking down file permissions (A) doesn’t stop the XML parser from reading sensitive files if it still processes external entities. So A alone isn’t really enough. If you can’t disable external entities, then more controls like WAF or patching the parser are necessary, but from the options given, C is usually the best recommendation if feasible.

C/D? I get why disabling external entities (C) is the solid fix since it cuts off the exploit at its root. But if the app depends on XML features that break when you disable those entities, a WAF (D) could act as a good safety net to catch these attacks before they hit the app. So, if disabling isn’t an option right away, D might be the practical next step. A and B don’t really address the core issue here.

It’s A because if the tester can clone badge info found in public areas, they might bypass guards and vestibule controls without needing to physically tailgate or pick locks, which are much riskier.

B imo, tailgating is usually the easiest way around physical security if guards are around but busy. Cloning badges or lock picking seems way riskier without more info on electronic access controls.

D is clearly off since it’s not generating a valid shellcode payload at all. Between A, B, and C, what stands out is encoding for AV evasion. B uses Meterpreter reverse shell, which is powerful but doesn’t mention encoders. C’s just a reverse shell without encoding. So A fits the question best since shikata_ga_nai is designed to obfuscate payloads to bypass antimalware detection, making it the better choice for that specific need.

Good point about the encoder in option A—it’s built specifically for evading AV detection by obfuscating the payload. B and C are solid reverse shells but don’t mention encoding or obfuscation, which is key when antimalware is involved. D is definitely off-topic anyway. So I’d say A fits best since it combines the right architecture, platform, and a well-known encoder designed for stealth against antimalware.

B/D? The request targets an API endpoint with a fuzzed token, which fits API abuse. But if the tester aims to exploit token weaknesses to gain higher access, it edges toward privilege escalation.

B fuzzing the Authorization header is classic API abuse, trying to find weak tokens or bypass controls. It’s not about server-side request forgery or directory traversal since the path is straightforward.

C for tool; definitely remove /admin and /secret since they’re sensitive directories.

Tool C seems better since it’s known for crawling and analyzing robots.txt directly. Definitely recommend removing /admin and /secret since those leak sensitive areas that attackers could target.

For Part 1, the exploit targets the specific vulnerable version shown, so that fits. For Part 2, since the sudo output lists commands allowed without a password, those commands are your best bet for escalation—no need to try unrelated binaries.

Part 1’s command fits the service version; Part 2 should focus on sudo permissions shown.

Looks like the payloads clearly show classic SQL injection patterns, so focusing on input validation and prepared statements is key. Option C seems right since it mentions parameterized queries, which block injections effectively.

B looks like cross-site scripting since it has script tags. The fix should be output encoding or input validation instead of SQL-focused options.

I agree option C fits well for the SYN scan, but also consider why ports 22 and 80 are open—SSH could be vulnerable to brute force or outdated ciphers, HTTP might have web app flaws. Another angle is to check for default or weak credentials since those services often get exploited that way. Even if it’s a stealth scan, the attacker’s probing those specific services for a reason, so focusing on them makes sense for follow-up testing.

Option C for the command, and look into open SSH and HTTP ports.

Option D shows actual web services running, making it more useful than just DNS entries.

Option C confirms live services on specific ports, more reliable than DNS lists.